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POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THE ACT IN ITS 
ENTIRETY AS UNCONSTITUTIONAL, VOID AND UN-
ENFORCEABLE AND IN VIOLATION OF THE FOUR-
TEENTH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION AND IN VIOLATION OF THE UTAH 
CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE I, SECTIONS 1, 2, 7, 18, 23 
AND 24, ARTICLE VI, SECTION 36, AND ARTICLE 
XXII, SECTION 20, IN THE FOLLOWING RESPECTS: 
(A) THE STATUTORY PRESUMPTION THAT IN 
THE ABSENCE OF PROOF OF A LESSER COST, THE 
COST AS DEFINED IN THE ACT MEANS SIX PER-
CENT (6%) ABOVE INVOICE OR REPLACEMENT 
COST, LESS TRADE DISCOUNTS, EXCEPT CASH DIS-
COUNTS, PLUS FREIGHT CHARGES (OR 6% PER-
CENT THAT THE RETAILER PAYS FOR CARTAGE) 
IS AN ARBITRARY, UNREASONABLE AND UNCON-
STITUTIONAL STANDARD IN THAT IT APPLIES 
THAT SAME STANDARD TO ALL GOODS AND TO 
ALL MERCHANDISE WITHOUT REGARD TO DIFFER-
ING PRICE AND COST FACTORS INHERENT IN RE-
TAIL MERCHANDISING AS WELL AS DIFFERENT 
PRICE AND COST FACTORS PERTAINING TO THE 
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INDIVIDUAL RETAILER. ALSO, IT IS PRICE FIXING 
IN THAT IT IS NOT A REAL ALTERNATIVE. (R. 43, 
Conclusions of Law, a, c, d, and e) 
(B) THE DEFINITION OF THE TERM "REPLACE-
MENT COST" IN THE ACT IS VAGUE, AMBIGUOUS 
AND UNENFORCEABLE AND PLACES AN UNREAS-
ONABLE BURDEN ON THE RETAIL MERCHANT IN 
DETERMINING WHETHER OR NOT HIS PRICE FOR 
A PARTICULAR ITEM OF MERCHANDISE IS OR IS 
NOT IN VIOLATION OF THE ACT. (R. 44, Conclusions 
of Law, f) 
(C) THE ACT IS ARBITRARY, UNCONSTITUTION-
AL AND UNREASONABLE IN PROHIBITING A SALE 
BELOW COST AS DEFINED IN THE ACT WHERE THE 
ONLY INTENT OF THE RETAILER IN PRICING THE 
ITEMS BELOW COST IS TO INDUCE CUSTOMERS 
OF THE RETAILER TO PURCHASE OTHER MERCH-
ANDISE OF THAT RETAILER, AND IS VAGUE AND 
AMBIGUOUS IN DEFINING THE PROHIBITED IN-
TENT OF UNFAIRLY DIVERTING TRADE FROM A 
COMPETITOR OR INJURING A COMPETITOR. (R. 44, 
45, Conclusions of Law, g, h) 
(D) THE STATUTORY PRESUMPTION OF PER-
CENTAGE MARKUP PRESENT IN THE ACT WITH 
ITS CRIMINAL SANCTIONS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY 
SHIFTS THE BURDEN OF PROOF TO DEFENDANTS. 
(R. 43, 44, Conclusions of Law, b, i) 
(E) THE TERM "LEGAL PRICE OF A COMPETITOR" 
AS USED IN SECTION 13-5-12 ( d) IS UNCONSTITOT-
ION ALLY VAGUE, AMBIGUOUS, AND UNENFORCE-
ABLE IF CONSTRUED AS REQUIRING A RET.\ILEH 
TO DETERMINE AT HIS PERIL WHETHER A COM-
PETITOR IN ADVERTISING OR SELLING A PARTIC-
IN DEX-( Continued) 
Page 
ULAR ITEM IS NOT A SALE BELOW COST AS DE-
FINED IN THE ACT WITH THE INTENT PROHIBIT-
ED BY THE ACT. (R. 45, Conclusions of Law, k) 
(F) HE PRESUMPTION SET FORTH IN SECTION 
13-5-9 (2) PRESENT IN THE ACT, WITH ITS CRIM-
INAL SANCTIONS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY SHIFTS 
THE BURDEN OF PROOF TO THE DEFENDANTS 
AND ARBITRARILY ASSUMES A PROHIBITED IN-
TENT WITH A FACT UNRELATED TO THE STATE 
OF MIND OF THE DEFENDANT. (R. 45, Conclusions of 
Law, I) 
POINT II _______________ _ -- ---------------------- ----------------------------------- 23 
WITH RESPECT TO GRAND CENTRAL'S SALE OF 
AQUA NET HAIR SPRAY AT FORTY NINE CENTS 
AND SKAGG'S SALE OF STYLE HAIR SPRAY AT 
FORTY NINE CENTS ON JUNE 23rd, 1966, THE 
COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THEY WERE EACH 
MADE BY THEM IN AN ENDEAVOR TN GOOD FAITH 
TO MEET THE PRICES OF THEIR COMPETITOR, 
SHOPPERS DISCOUNT, AND IN HOLDING THAT 
THEY WERE ENTITLED TO ASSUME THAT THE AD-
VERTISED PRICE OF SHOPPERS DISCOUNT FOR 
AQUA NET HAIR SPRAY WAS A LEGAL PRICE IN THE 
ABSENCE OF ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF AN ILLEGAL 
SALE BY SHOPPERS DISCOUNT IN VIOLATION OF 
THE ACT. (R. 46(a).) 
POINT III ___ _ ________________________________ ---------------------- - 24 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE SALE 
BY SKAGGS OF CIGARETTES AND THE GIFT OF A 
CIGARETTE LIGHTER WITH A CARTON OF CIGA-
RETTES DID NOT VIOLATE THE ACT BECAUSE THE 
SALE OF THE CIGARETTES ALONE WAS NOT A SALE 
INDEX-( Contmued1 
BELOW COST AS DEFINED IN THE ACT AND THE 
GIFT OF THE CIGARETTE LIGHTER WAS A GIFT, 
NOT A SALE, AND NOT PROHIBITED BY SECTION 
13-5-9 OF THE ACT. (R. 46. b) 
POINT IV .................................................................... 25 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE 
PLAINTIFF FAILED TO INTRODUCE SUFFICIENT 
EVIDENCE THAT THE INTENT OF SKAGGS AND/OR 
GRAND CENTRAL IN MAKING THE SALE OF ASPIR-
INS, SWINGER CAMERA, LEE'S MEN'S PANTS, AND 
TURKEYS, WAS TO INDUCE THE PURCHASE OF 
OTHER MERCHANDISE OR TO UNLAWFULLY DI-
VERT TRADE FROM A COMPETITOR OR TO OTHER-
WISE INJURE A COMPETITOR. (R. 413, 47, 48) 
CONCLUSION ... 27 
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In The Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
TRADE COMMISSION OF UT AH, l 
ST ATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff - Appellant, 
- vs -
SKAGGS DRUG CENTERS, INC., 
GRAND CENTRAL STORES, INC., 
d/b/a WARSHAW'S GIANT FOOD 
and GRAND CENTRAL DRUGS,INC., 
Defendants - Respondents. 
and UTAH RETAIL GROCERS' 
ASSOCIATION 
Intervenor - Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
11034 
Case No. 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
This case involves a complaint by the plaintiff, 
the Trade Commission cf Utah, herein referred to as 
the "Trade Cornission," against the defendantE', 
Skaggs Drug Center, Inc., herein referred to as 
"Skaggs," Grand Central Stores, Inc., d/b/a War-
shaw's Giant Food c:md Grand Central Drugs, Inc., 
herein referred to as "Grand Central," charging e_ 
.riolation of the Utah State Unfair Practices Act here-
2 
in referred to as the "Act" unless more specific sec-
tions are clted. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
A complaint wa2 filed in the District Court of Salt 
Lake County on the 16th day of Septeber, 1966, by 
the Trade Commission charging Skaggs on six ' 
counts and Grand Central on five counts of violat-
ing the Utah State Unfair Practices Act. On the 22nd 
day of December, 1966, pursuant to a motion, the 
Utah Retail Grocer's Associatoin was permitted to 
intervene as a party plaintiff. The matter came on 
for hearing on the 16th day of May, 1967, before the 
Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, sitting without a jury, 
at Salt Lake City, Utah. After having entered its 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the court 
entered judgment on the 13th day of September, 
1967, in favor of the defendants and against the 
plaintiff and intervenor on each count of plaintiff's 
complaint. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellant respectfully submits that the judc;-
ment of the lower court be reversed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On the 23rd day of June, 1966, Skaggs and 
Grand Central each advertized Crest Family Tooth-
paste at fifty cents. which is below cost as defined in 
the Act, with intent and puroose of inducing the 
3 
purchase of other merchandise or of unfairly divert-
ing trade from a competitor or otherwise injuring a 
competitor. (R. 37) 
On or about June 16th, 1966, Shoppers' Discount 
Store, Inc., herein referred to as "Shoppers Dis-
count," advertised and sold Aqua Net Hair Spray at 
forty-nine cents, which was a sale below cost as de-
fined in the Act. On June 23rd, 1966, Grand Central 
advertised Aqua Net Hair Spray, and Skaggs adver-
tised Style Hair Spray, a comparable product, for 
sale at forty-nine cents, each of which was a sale be-
low cost as defined in the Act. The sale by Grand 
Central and Skaggs was an endeavor to meet the 
price of Shoppers Discount, all of which are com-
petitors. Neither of said defendants at any time had 
any actual knowledge that the Shoppers Discount 
price on such item was a sale below cost, as de-
fined by the Act. The Trade Commission, to the 
knowledge of Skaggs or Grand Central, had not 
taken any action against Shoppers Discount to en-
force the provisions of the Act with respect to its sale 
of AqUa Net Hair Spray for forty-nine cents. How-
ever, Skaggs and Grand Central made no effort to 
determine if the price of the competitor's item was 
below cost or not. (T. 62, 43) Aqua Net Hair Spray is 
a product with wide wholesale price fluxuations 
which can be purchased by retailers, including 
Skaggs, Grand Central, and Shoppers Discount, in 
numerous ways from many different suppliers. (R. 
37, 38) 
On or about June 20th, 1966, Skaggs advertised 
cartons of cigarettes for $2.73, and gave a cigarette 
4 
lighter free with each purchase of a carton, which 
cigarette lighter cost Skaggs twenty-five cents each. 
The sale of the carton of cigarettes alone was not a 
sale below cost as defined in the Act, but the com-
bined sales, cigarettes and lighter if taken together 
and considered a single item, was a sale below cost 
as defined in the Act. (R. 39) 
On June 16th, 1966, Skaggs advertised in the 
Provo Daily Herald in Provo, Utah, the sale of Viman-
al Vitamins at eighty-three cents per one hundred 
tablets, which sale was a sale below cost as defined 
in the Act. In the Provo, Utah trade area, Vimanal 
Vitamins are offered for sale and sold exclusively 
by Skaggs, thus Skaggs has no competitors with 
respect to said item. (R. 39, 40) 
On June 23rd, 1966, Skaggs and Grand Central 
each offered Bayer Aspirin (lOOcm) at fifty-five cents 
per one hundred. Bayer Aspirin is supplied and de-
livered direc1ly to the defendants retail outlets by 
the supplier without cartage cost to the defendants. 
Bayer Aspirin is a product in constant demand by 
customers of defendants with a high turnover and 
with little labor, waste, spoilage, or advertising cost 
to defendants. The sale of Bayer Aspirin at fifty-five 
cents by Grand Central was not a sale below cost 
as defined in the Act, but the sale of the same item 
at the same price was a sale below cost as defined in 
the Act. (R. 40) 
On or about June 20th, 1966, Skaggs advertised 
for sale at $13.49 Polaroid Swinger Cameras, limited 
to one per customer, which was less than the entire 
5 
supply owned or possessed by Skaggs. The p:i:"ice 
at which said item was sold was a sale below cost as 
defined in the Act. The court found that but for the 
presumption set forth in Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 13-5-5(2) (1962), that Skaggs, by such sale, intended 
to injure competitors or destroy competition, there 
was insufficient evidence introduced by plaintiff's 
to justify a finding by this court that Skaggs offered 
said items for sale with the intent and purpose of in-
ducing the purchase of other merchandise or of un-
fairly diverting trade from a competitor or other-
wise injuring a competitor. (R. 40) 
On June 16th, 1966, Grand Central advertised 
Lee's Men's Pants at two pairs for $5.00, which was a 
sale below cost as defined in the Act. The court 
found that the sale by Grand Central was not with 
the intent to induce purchase of other merchandise, 
to unfairly divert trade from a competitor, or to other-
wise injure a competitor, but was done with the sole 
intent and purpose of reducing what Grand Central 
in good faith believed was an excessive inventory 
in their store at the time of Lee's Men's Pants. (R. 41) 
On November 8th, 1965, Grand Central pur-
chased frozen tom turkeys at thirty-three and one 
half cents a pound. Thereafter, on December 17th, 
1965, more than thirty days after the original pur-
chase, additional frozen tom turkeys were pur-
chased at an invoice cost of thirty-seven and one 
half cents per pound. On December 17th, 1965, and 
thereafter, Grand Central had in stock co-mingled 
frozen tom turkeys purchased on November 8th, 
6 
1965, at thirty-three and one half cents per pound 
and frozen tom turkeys purchased on December 
17th, 1965, at thirty-seven and one half cents per 
pound. The co-mingled turkeys were subsequently 
sold by Grand Central on and after December 17th, 
1965, for thirty-seven cents per pound, which was a 
sale below cost as defined in the Act in that the 
turkeys purchased November 8th, 1965, were sold 
more than thirty days from the date of such purchase 
and the replacement cost of the same at that time 
was thirty-seven and one half cents per pound, and 
the turkeys purchased on December 17th, 1965, 
were sold at thirty-seven cents which was a sale be-
low cost as defined in the Act. The sales by Grand 
Central on or prior to December 8th, 1965, of the 
turkeys purchased on November 8th, 1965, were not 
sales below cost as defined in the Act. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THE ACT IN ITS 
ENTIRETY AS UNCONSTITUTIONAL, VOID AND UN-
ENFORCEABLE AND IN VIOLATION OF THE FOUR-
TEENTH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION AND IN VIOLATION OF THE UTAH 
CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE I, SECTIONS 1, 2, 7, 18, 23 
AND 24, ARTICLE VI, SECTION 36, AND ARTICLE 
XXII, SECTION 20, IN THE FOLLOWING RESPECTS: 
(A) THE STATUTORY PRESUMPTION THAT IN 
THE ABSENCE OF PROOF OF A LESSER COST, THE 
COST AS DEFINED IN THE ACT MEANS SIX PER-
CENT (6%) ABOVE INVOICE OR REPLACEMENT 
COST, LESS TRADE DISCOUNTS, EXCEPT CASH DIS-
COUNTS, PLUS FREIGHT CHARGES (OR 6314 PER-
CENT THAT THE RETAILER PAYS FOR CARTAGE) 
IS AN ARBITRARY, UNREASONABLE AND UNCON-
STITUTIONAL STANDARD IN THAT IT APPLIES 
THAT SAME STANDARD TO ALL GOODS AND TO 
ALL MERCHANDISE WITHOUT REGARD TO DIFFER-
ING PRICE AND COST FACTORS INHERENT IN RE-
TAIL MERCHANDISING AS WELL AS DIFFERENT 
PRICE AND COST FACTORS PERTAINING TO THE 
INDIVIDUAL RETAILER. ALSO, IT IS PRICE FIXING 
IN THAT IT IS NOT A REAL ALTERNATIVE. (R. 43, 
Conclusions of Law, a, c, d, and e) 
(B) THE DEFINITION OF THE TERM "REPLACE-
MENT COST" IN THE ACT IS VAGUE, AMBIGUOUS 
AND UNENFORCEABLE AND PLACES AN UNREAS-
ONABLE BURDEN ON THE RETAIL MERCHANT IN 
DETERMINING WHETHER OR NOT HIS PRICE FOR 
A PARTICULAR ITEM OF MERCHANDISE IS OR IS 
NOT IN VIOLATION OF THE ACT. (R. 44, Conclusions 
of Law, f) 
(C) THE ACT IS ARBITRARY, UNCONSTITUTION-
AL AND UNREASONABLE IN PROHIBITING A SALE 
BELOW COST AS DEFINED IN THE ACT WHERE THE 
ONLY INTENT OF THE RETAILER IN PRICING THE 
ITEMS BELOW COST IS TO INDUCE CUSTOMERS 
OF THE RETAILER TO PURCHASE OTHER MERCH-
ANDISE OF THAT RETAILER, AND IS VAGUE AND 
AMBIGUOUS IN DEFINING THE PROHIBITED IN-
TENT OF UNFAIRLY DIVERTING TRADE FROM A 
COMPETITOR OR INJURING A COMPETITOR. (R. 44, 
45, Conclusions of Law, g, h) 
(D) THE STATUTORY PRESUMPTION OF PER-
CENTAGE MARKUP PRESENT IN THE ACT WITH 
ITS CRIMINAL SANCTIONS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY 
SHIFTS THE -BURDEN. OF PROOF TO DEFENDANTS. 
(R. 43, 44, Conclusions of Law, b, i) 
(E) .THE TERM "LEGAL PRICE OF A COMPETITOR" 
AS USED IN SECTION 13-5-12 (d) IS UNCONSTITUT-
IONALLY VAGUE, AMBIGUOUS, AND UNENFORCE-
ABLE IF CONSTRUED AS REQUIRING A RETAILER 
TO DETERMINE AT HIS PERIL WHETHER A COM-
PETITOR IN ADVERTISING OR SELLING A PARTIC-
ULAR ITEM IS NOT A SALE BELOW COST AS DE-
FINED IN THE ACT WITH THE INTENT PROHIBIT-
ED BY THE ACT. (R. 45, Conclusions of Law, k) 
(F) HE PRESUMPTION SET FORTH IN SECTION 
13-5-9 (2) PRESENT IN THE ACT, WITH ITS CRIM-
INAL SANCTIONS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY SHIFTS 
THE BURDEN OF PROOF TO THE DEFENDANTS 
AND ARBITRARILY ASSUMES A PROHIBITED IN-
TENT WITH A FACT UNRELATED TO THE STATE 
OF MIND OF THE DEFENDANT. (R. 45, Conclusions of 
Law, I) 
Nearly all states of the Union have some form 
of legislation governing unfair business practices 
with the majority of them having some provision 
prohibiting sales below cost. There have been a 
number of reasons given for the need of such legis-
lation. 
The United States Supreme Court in Safeway 
v. Oklahoma Retail Grocers Ass'n, 360 U.S. 334 (1959) 
stated: 
... ~ne of the chief aims of state laws prohibiting 
sales below cost to put an end to "loss-leader" 
selling. The selling of selected goods at a loss in 
order to lure customers into the store is deemed not 
only a destructive means of competition; it also 
plays on the gullibility of customers by leading 
them to expect what generally is not true, namely, 
that a store which offers such an amazing bargain 
is full of other such bargains. Clearly there is a 
reasonable basis for a conclusion that selective 
price cuts tend to perpetrate this abuse ... (Emph-
asis added.) 
The Utah State Supreme Court gave another 
reason in Burt v. Woolsulate. 146 P.2d 203 (1944) in 
which it stated: 
... As a part of the same movement resort was had 
to the Unfair Practices Acts. These latter statutes 
could not standardize prices as Fair Trade Acts 
had done, but they did aim at alleviating the hard-
ships of "cut-throat," competition . 
. . . One of the practices aimed at by these statutes 
is that, common with chain stores, of selling at 
lower prices in one locality than in another and 
making up losses incurred by profits in other 
stores .... (Emphasis added.) 
This latter approach of selling at different prices 
at different stores was admitted in testimony given 
on behalf of Skaggs Drugs and Grand Central (T. 
48, 49, 122) Of course, the eventual effect of this 
"cut-throat" competittion is to drive the smaller mer-
chant out of business and leave fewer and fewer 
companies to compete until they eventually dom-
inate the market and destroy competition. 
l ll 
In Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram 
Distillers Corp., 299 U.S. 183, 57 S. Ct. 139, 81 L.EJ 
109 (1936), the court said: 
There is a great body of fact and opinion tending 
to show that price cutting by retail dealers is not 
only injurious to the good will and business of the 
producer and distributor of identified goods, The 
evidence to that effect is voluminous; * * *. 
The majority of the courts have upheld the con-
stitutionality of laws which prohibit sales below cost 
and have said that they are not violative of the due 
process and equal protection clauses of the federal, 
and our respective state constitutions. They have 
held that it is within the police power of the state 
and the legislature is vested with wide discretions in 
determining whatever economic policy may be 
deemed to promote the public welfare and the 
courts are not able to override the policy so long as 
the laws bear a reasonable relationship to the legis-
lative purpose and are neither arbitrary and discrim-
inatory nor vague and ambiguous. See Avella v. 
Almac's, 211A.2d665 (R.I. 1965); Guine v. Civil Serv· 
ice Comm'n, 141 S.E.2d 364 (W.V. 1965); Bordon v. 
Thompson, 353 S.W.2d 735 (Mo. 1962); Rocky Moun· 
lain Wholesale Co. v. Ponca Wholesale Mercantile 
Co., 68 N.M. 228, 360 P.2d 643 (1961); Simonetti, Inc. 
v. State ex rel. Gallion, 272 Ala. 398, 132 So.2d 252 
(1961); State v. Consumer Warehouse Market, 183 
Kan. 502, 329 P.2d 638 (1958). Other decisions are col-
lected and analyzed in 128 A.LR. 1126 and 118 
A.LR. 506. 
The Supreme Court of the United States m Neb-
bia v. People of State of New York, 291 U.S. 502, 54 
S.Ct. 505, 78 L.Ed. 940 (1933), stated: 
So far as the requirements of due process is con-
cerned, and in the absence of other constitutional 
restriction, a state is free to adopt whatever econ-
omic policy may reasonably be deemed to promote 
public welfare, and to enforce that policy by legis-
slation adapted to i.ts purpose. The courts are with-
out authority either to declare such policy, or, when 
it is declared by the legislature, to override it. If 
the laws passed are seen to have a reasonable re-
lation to a proper legislative purpose, and are nei-
ther arbitrary nor discriminatory, the requirements 
of due process are satisfied, and judicial determ-
ination to that effect renders a court functus offic-
io. 'Whether the free operation of the normal laws 
of competition is a wise and wholesome rule for 
trade and commerce is an economic question which 
this court need not consider or determine.' North-
ern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 
337, 338, 24 S. Ct. 436, 457, 48 L.Ed. 679. And it is 
equally clear that if the legislative policy be to curb 
unrestrained and harmful competition by measures 
which are not arbitrary or discriminatory it does 
not lie with the courts to determine that the rule 
is unwise. With the wisdom of the policy adopted, 
with the adequacy or practicability of the law en-
acted to forward it, the courts are both incompetent 
and unauthorized to deal. The course of decision 
in this court exhibits a firm adherence to these 
principles. Times without number we have said 
that the Legislature is primarily the judge of the 
necessity of such an enactment, that every possible 
presumption is in favor of its validity, and that 
though the court may hold views inconsistent with 
the wisdom of the law, it may not be annulled un-
less palpably in excess of legislative power. 
. . . The Constitution does not secure to any one 
liberty to conduct his business in such fashion as to 
inflict injury upon the public at large, or upon any 
substantial group of people .... 
(A) 
The Act is not too vague in that it is impos-
sible to show a lesser cost than that of the presumed 
6% cost because of the problem of accurately al-
locating all of the variable accounting costs to any 
single item. The lesser cost mnst be a "markup to 
cover a proportionate part of the cost of doing busi-
ness.'' 
This was the principle point of issue in the case 
of Flank Oil Co. v. Tennessee Gas Transmission Co., ' 
349 P.2d 1005 (Colo. 1960), and the court after re-
viewing the various cases concluded that the 
phrase "cost of doing business" was not too vague 
and quoted from State v. Langley, 84 P.2d 767 (Wyo. 
1938): 
Hence, in the absence of provisions to the contrary, 
we must presume that the legislature did not intend 
to prescribe that the cost must be absolutely exact, 
and that it must be based upon the precise method 
of accounting which any one merchant might adopt, 
but meant, by "cost," what businessmen generally 
mean, namely the approximate cost arrived at by 
a reasonable rule. Hence, if a particular method 
adopted by a merchant cannot, under the facts dis-
closed, be said to be unreasonable, and does not 
disclose an intentional evasion of the law, and the 
method so adopted should be accepted as correct. In 
other words, all that man is required to do under 
this statute is to act in good faith ... The standard 
set by the legislature is virtually reduced to one of 
reasonableness. And it is held that "reasonable-
ness" as "a standard of an act, which can determine 
objectively from circumstances, is a common, wide-
ly-used, and constitutionally valid standard in law." 
The court went on to say: 
The fact that the act is difficult to administer does 
not justify a ruling of invalidity and it would ap-
pear that the defendants "complexity" argument 
finally reduces itself to this. In People v. Payless 
Drug Store, supra, the court commented ... "Any 
difficulty in computing cost is a factual one, and 
statutes are not to be declared invalid because in 
their application factual difficulties may arise." 
(25 Cal.2d 108, 153 P.2d 15). In Hale v. Kusy, 
supra, the Nebraska court said: ... "Mere difficulty 
of application in the process of litigation is not 
enough to enable a court to say that a statute is 
unconstitutional" ( 150 Neb. 643, 35 N.W.2d 597). 
In regards to applying the six percent figure to 
differing price and cost factors of various types of 
merchandise, the court in State v. Consumers Ware-
house, supra, stated: 
Another contention advanced by appellee is that 
the Act is arbitrary, unreasonable and discrimin-
atory because, in defining costs, G.S. 1949, 50-401 
(a) and (b) sets a standard markup of six-percent 
for retailers and two percent for wholesalers as the 
cost of doing business, in the absence of proof of 
lesser costs. The principal argument made on this 
point is that there are many lines or merchandise 
which are normally sold at a greater markup than 
the standards specified, hence the Act affords no 
protection from unfair competition by sales below 
actual cost in such lines of merchandise. Assuming 
the truth of this argument, it is directed merely 
against the wisdom of the legislature in selecting 
the area of competition to be afforded the highest 
degree of protection under the Act. We are unwill-
ing to say that it was unreasonable or arbitrary 
for that body to conclude that the greatest danger 
to fair competition existed through price cutting 
in the high turnover, low markup business, where a 
slight margin separated profit from disaster, and 
that such businesses, coming within the scope of its 
terms, demostrates that it is not discriminatory. 
Moreover, the legislature is not required to cover 
all evils of like character in a single Act (State ex 
rel. Mitchell v. Sage Stores Co., 157 Kan. at page 
414, 141 P.2d at page 661, supra, and cases there 
cited). 
This is not a price fixing statute because there 
is an adequate alternative if the reasonable stand-
ard is used p.s adopted in State v. Langley, supra. 
Even jf it were price fixing this is not grounds 
for declaring the Act unconstitutional. The Court in 
Nebbia v. People of the State of New York. supra. 
stated: 
... But there can he no doubt upon proper occasion 
and by appropriate measures the state may regu-
late a business in any aspects, including the pricPs 
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to be charged for the products or commodities it 
sells . 
. . . Price control, like any other form of regulation, 
is unconstitutional only if arbitrary, discriminatory, 
or demonstrably irrelevant to the policy the Legis-
lature is free to adopt, and hence an unnecessary 
and unwarranted interference with individual lib-
erty. 
The court in Wholesale Tobacco Dealers Bureau 
of Southern California, Inc. v. National Candy & To-
bacco Co., 11 Cal.2d 634, 82 P.2d 3, at page 9 (1938), 
reviewed this same charge of price fixing and found 
a similar statute not to be so. 
(B) 
The court in Avella v. Almac's, 211 A.2d 665 
(R.I. 1965), reviewed basically the same wording as 
found in the Utah statute and found that portion of 
the law here in question to be valid. 
Here we do not have the problem of adding op-
erating costs to each item. We are dealing only 
with the invoice cost which is easily calculated. The 
only possible problem might be some future rebate 
determined by accumulative volume purchasing. 
If this problem should arise, then the reasonableness 
standards of State v. Langley, supra, should be used. 
(C) 
It is claimed to be unconstitutional in that there 
is not a sufficient evil intent to create a criminal 
statute. The example given is that "the intent and 
purpose of inducing the purchase of other merchan-
dise" is not evil in that no one is injured and thus 
no evil. result need be accomplished to make the 
seller guilty. 
Utah Code Ann. ~ 13-5-17 (1962), sets forth the 
policy of the act: 
The legislature declared that the purpose of this 
act is to safeguard the public against the creation 
or perpetuation of monopolies and to foster and 
encourage competition, by prohibiting unfair and 
discriminatory practice by which fair and honest 
competition is destroyed or prevented. This act 
shall be liberally construed that its beneficial pur-
poses may be subserved. 
Utah Code Ann. ~ 13-5-7(a) (1962), provides: 
It is hereby declared that any advertising, offer to 
sell, or sale of any merchandise, either by retailers 
or wholesalers, at less than cost as defined in this 
act with the intent and purpose of inducing the 
purchase of other merchandise or of unfairly divert-
ing trade from a competitor or otherwise injuring 
a competitor, impairs and prevents fair competition, 
injures public welfare, is unfair competition con-
trary to public policy and the policy of this act 
and is declared to be a violation of this act. 
It is not the contents of the phrase, the "purpose 
of inducing the purchase of other merchandise." 
that the legislature has found to be evil. Rather, it is 
the selling of merchandise below cost to induce the 
purchase of other merchandise that is evil. The 
courts have recognized this evil and have in effect 
said, as does the statute, that it is "a desructive 
means of competition" and "plays on the gullibility 
of customers by leading them to expect what gen-
erally is not true," and is therefore "a reasonable 
basis for a conclusion that selective price cuts tend 
to perpetrate this abuse." See Safeway v. Oklahoma 
Retail Grocer's Ass'n, supra. and Burt v. Woolsulate, 
supra. 
The court in Laundry Operating Co. v. Spalding 
Laundry, 383 S.\l\T.2d 364 (Kan. 1964) stated: 
We do not suggest that a purpose to divert or capt-
ure a competitor's business is wrong or unethical. 
It is perfectly legitimate so long as it is not carried 
out unfairly. The legislature simply has declared it 
unfair to accomplish it through giving away goods 
or services or selling them for less than cost. 
The very nature of business is to acquire as 
much business as economically possible from any 
source. including any competitors. (T. 45, 4.6) Al-
though the businessman may not have any evil 
feelings toward his competitor, he is like the walrus 
in "Through The Looking Glass" who shed copious 
tears as he devoured the innocent oysters who ac-
cepted his invitation to stroll along the beach. He 
meant them no harm of course. He merely wished 
to to eat them. 
It is fundamental logic that prolonged competi-
tion by selling itmes below cost will soon result in 
only the most financially strong company remaining 
and thus, competition is destroyed. 
(D) 
The criminal sanctions have not been made a. 
part of this action and therefore should not be con-
sidered at this time. Avella v. Almac's. supra. 
Even if it did apply, there is no shifting of the 
burden of proof but rather the shifting of the burden 
of going forward with the evidence, which is cer-
tainly not unconstitutional. 29 Am. Jur. 2d, Evidence, 
§ 123 to 127. This is especially true when we are 
dealing with matters which are best known to the 
party charged as we are in these types of cases. 
(E) 
Section l 3-5-l 2(d) exempts from the act the sales 
made: 
(d) In an endeavor made in good faith to meet 
the legal prices of a competitor as herein defined 
selling the same article, product, or commodity 
in the some locality or trade area. 
Under an identical provision found in the Cali-
fornia law this point is discussed by the court in 
People v. PayLess Drug Store, 153 P.2d 9 (Calif. 1944), 
wherein the court stated: 
The defendants contend that they should not be 
compelled to ascertain "legal prices" of their com-
petitors before invoking the exception provided by 
19 
subdivision ( d) of section 6 for the reason that it is 
impossible to ascertain the legal prices of compet-
itors goods without an audit of their books. The 
defendants have assumed an absolute prerequisite. 
The requirement is not absolute. It is merely that 
the defendants have endeavored "in good faith" to 
meet the legal prices of a competitor. A similar pro-
vision was upheld in State v. Sears, 4 Wash.2d 200, 
103 P.2d 337, 345, the court saying "That if a mer-
chant in good faith reduces his prices to meet those 
of a competitor, who he in good faith believes has a 
legal price, he will not be violating either the intent 
or the wording of the act." The provision therefore 
is not like that involved in Commonwealth v. Zas-
loff, 338 Pa. 457, 13 A.2d 67, 128 A.L.R. 1120 (See, 
also, State v. Packard-Hamburger and Co., 123 
N.J.L. 180, 8 A.2d 291), holding invalid a provision 
which exempted the merchant if the price was made 
"to meet the legal price of a competitor as an ab-
solute requirement without according him the op-
portunity of showing his good faith .... " 
See Mcintire v. Borossky, 59 A.2d 471 (N.H. 
1948). 
This approach is consistent with the recent case 
in the State of Washington of State v. Albertson. 412 
P.2d 755 (1966), where the court refers to the "good 
faith" belief that the defendant was meeting the 
legal prices of a competitor. The court held that it 
was not necessary for the defendant to look at the 
books of a competitor to determine the legal price 
but he must "in good faith" believe the price to be 
legal. In that case the defendant had made an ef-
fort in good faith to determine if the price of his com-
petitor was legal. 
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(f) 
A presumption of illegal intent has been struck 
down in several cases from other jurisdictions. W. , 
M. Wiley v. Sampson-Ripley Co .. 120 A.2d 289 (1956); 
Motts Supermarkets. Inc. v. Traasinelli. 148 Conn. 
481, 172 A.2d 381 ( 196] ). In those cases, the mere fact 
of a sale below cost created the presumption. How-
ever, even under these types of statutes, a number 
of courts have found such a presumption valid. 
In People v. PayLess Drug Stores. supra. the 
court held that a presumption of unlawful intent may 
be made from the mere fact of the sale below cost: 
A statutory requirement that the defendant go for-
ward with evidence to rebut a prima facie showing of 
guilty intent from proof of specified facts is per-
missable when the result has some rational relation 
to those facts and the defendant is given a fair op-
portunity to meet it by evidence. Morris v. Califor-
nia, 291 U.S. 82, 88, 54 S. Ct. 281, 284, 78 Law Ed. 
664. That case designates as a test of permissibility 
that "the state shall have proved enough to make 
it just for the defendant to be required to repel 
what has been proved with excuse or explanation, 
or at least that upon a balancing of convenience or 
of the opportunities or knowledge, the shifting of 
the burden will be found to be an aid to the accuser 
without subjecting the accused to hardship or op-
pression." Our statute does not withdraw from the 
accuser the burden of providing a violation, nor 
does it deprive the defendant of the benefit of pre-
sumption of innocence. Here there was a manifest 
disparity in conveniences of proof and opportunity 
for knowledge as between the plaintiff and the de-
fendants. The defendants were in a better position 
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to know the intent and purpose of their conduct, 
which it might be difficult for the plaintiff to prove. 
The Legislature merely enacted into law what is 
common human experience, but when a person 
causes injury by his acts, he should be deemed to 
intend such consequences unless he can excuse or 
explain his conduct by facts showing he had an in-
nocent intent. It was so enacted to avoid the pos-
sible conclusion that the accuser, from whom the 
defendant's purpose is generally concealed, must 
produce affirmative evidence of guilty intent in 
every situation in order to make out a prima facie 
case of a violation of the act. After proof of a sales 
below cost and injury resulting therefrom, there is 
no undue hardships cast upon the defendants to re-
quire them to come forward with evidence of their 
true intent as against the prima facie showing, or 
with evidence which will hring them in the specified 
exemptions in the act. The power to enact such a 
provision in appropriate cases has been upheld in 
this state. 
The Wisconsin statute states that sales at less 
than cost "shall be prima facie evidence of intent to 
induce the purchase of other merchandise, or to 
unfairly divert trade from a competitor, or to other-
wise injure a competitor." In a most recent case, 
State v. Eau Claire Oil Co .. 151 N.W.Zd 634 0Nisc. 
1967). the court held: 
We hold there is a rational connection between the 
facts presumed in the last sentence of sub. (4) of 
sec. 100.30, Stats., viz., "intent to induce the pur-
chase of other merchandise, or to unfairly divert 
trade from a competitor, or to otherwise injure a 
competitor" and the evidence of the selling by de-
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fendant of the mixed nuts, toilet tissue, and work 
gloves below cost. Therefore, it necessarily follows 
that the statutory presumption is constitutional as 
so applied. 
See Rocky Mountain Wholesale Co. v. Ponka 
Wholesale Mercantile Co., supra: Mering v. Yolo 
Grocery and Meat Market. 127 P.2d 985 (Calif. 1942), 
and Mcintyre v. Borossky. supra. 
Our own statute requires a sale below cost plus 
a limitation on the quantity to be sold per customer. 
Thus, creating a much closer relationship between 
the fact presumed and the fact proven. 
A merchants sole purpose for being in business 
is to qet customers to his store and sell him mer-
chandise at a profit. If he ceases doing this, he will 
soon be out of business. 
He is not going to sell merchandise, such as a 
camera, at a loss just to make as many of his custo-
mers as possible happy, as is contended by the de-
fendants. He obviously anticipates an economic gain 
from such an action. The gain of an economic ad 
vantage by loss selling is just what the legislature 
has declared to be an unfair business practice which 
impairs arid prevents fair competition and thus in-
jures the public we1fare. 
If there is any intent but to achieve an economic 
gain, why would Skaggs be so concerned about 
competitors purchasing the loss-leader items? (T. 39) 
In fact, this is the whole purpose of this provision 
which is to qive the marchants a self-policing tool 
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whereby they can take the edge off the economic 
advantages of loss-leader selling by purchasing 
large quantities of loss-items sold. 
POINT II 
WITH RESPECT TO (';RAND CENTRAL'S SALE OF 
AQUA NET HAIR SPRAY AT FORTY NINE CENTS 
AND SKAGG'S SALE OF STYLE HAIR SPRAY AT 
FORTY NINE CENTS ON JUNE 23rd, 1966, THE 
COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THEY WERE EACH 
"MADE BY THEM IN AN ENDEAVOR TN GOOD FAITH 
TO MEET THE PRICES OF THEIR COMPETITOR, 
SHOPPERS DISCOUNT, AND IN HOLDING THAT 
THEY WERE ENTITLED TO ASSUME THAT THE AD-
VERTISED PRICE OF SHOPPERS DISCOUNT FOR 
AQUA NET HAIR SPRAY WAS A LEGAL PRICE IN THE 
ABSENCE OF ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF AN ILLEGAL 
SALE BY SHOPPERS DISCOUNT IN VIOLATION OF 
THE ACT. (R. 46(a).) 
It is clear from the testimony given that there 
w0s absolutely no effort by Skaggs or Grand Central 
to determine whether or not the prices of their com-
p2titors were legal or not. (T. 3, 11, 24, 29, 43) No 
effcrl was made to contact the Trade Commission 
or ;;my suppliers to see if the low prices of the com-
1-1.::trtors were below cost or not. Some effort would 
be necessary in order to claim good faith. This is 
especially true when they are both big users of the 
Product and knew it was below their own cost as 
determined by the Act. 
The answer given for selling below cost was 
that it was an answer to a competitive situation that 
couldn't be left unanswered. (T. '.i) The law has pro-
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vided a legal means to answer any illegal economL: 
challenge such as this with triple damages awarded 
the injured party. Utah Code Ann. § 13-5-14 (1962). 
It is submitted that such challenges be resolved 
by law rather than in the open competitive markei 
place where an innocent small merchant gets ir.-
jured. See Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Oklahoma Retail 
Grocers Ass'n (Okla. 1957), 322 P.2d 179, 70 A.L.R.2d 
1068 and affirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court, supra. 
POINT III 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE SALE 
BY SKAGGS OF CIGARETTES AND THE GIFT OF A 
CIGARETTE LIGHTER WITH A CARTON OF CIGA-
RETTES DID NOT VIOLATE THE ACT BECAUSE THE 
SALE OF THE CIGARETTES ALONE WAS NOT A SALE 
BELOW COST AS DEFINED IN THE ACT AND THE 
GIFT OF THE CIGARETTE LIGHTER WAS A GIFT, 
NOT A SALE, AND NOT PROHIBITED BY SECTION 
13-5-9 OF THE ACT. (R. 46, b) 
Utah Code Ann. s 13-5-9(1) (Supp. 1965) has been 
interpreted to read that when the seller sells an 
item and in con.junction therewith, gives an ltem 
away, the cost to the seller of the item given away is 
not to be computed in considering whether the 
seller has·violated the act. Utah Code Ann. § 13-5-9(1) 
(Supp. 1965) provides: 
For the purpose of preventing evasion of this act in 
all sales involving more than one item or commod-
ity the vender's or distributor's selling price shall 
not be below the cost of all articles, products and 
commodities included in such transactions. Each 
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article, product or commodity individually adver-
tised or offered for sale, shall be individually sub-
ject to the requirements of § 13-5-7, when sold with 
other articles, products, or commodities. 
When a merchant offers a carton of cigarettes at 
a specified price and offers to give away a lighter 
with the purchase, it is only reasonable to assume 
that the sale involved both the carton of cigarettes 
and the lighter and that the cost of both items must 
be taken into account. The terms "all sales involv-
ing more than one item", "when sold with other 
articles", and "shall be individually subject to" of 
the above statute makes this clear. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE 
PLAINTIFF FAILED TO INTRODUCE SUFFICIENT 
EVIDENCE THAT THE INTENT OF SKAGGS AND/OR 
GRAND CENTRAL IN MAKING THE SALE OF ASPIR-
INS, SWINGER CAMERA, LEE'S MEN'S PANTS, AND 
TURKEYS, WAS TO INDUCE THE PURCHASE OF 
OTHER MERCHANDISE OR TO UNLAWFULLY DI-
VERT TRADE FROM A COMPETITOR OR TO OTHER-
WISE INJURE A COMPETITOR (R. 46, 47, 48) 
All of the above prices are below cost. Skaggs 
and Grand Central are profit making businesses and 
iI they sold all their items below cost they would 
soon be out of business. Making a profit on invest·· 
ment is their reason for existing. A sale below cost 
1vuuld be contrary to their interest unless they an-
ticipated an over-all economic gain from such an 
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action. The economic gain of course is to bring cus 
tomers into the store. (T. 5, 45, 46, 55) 
The principal purpose for getting customers 
into the store by the use of low prices is to get them 
to purchase other merchandise. (T. 46) 
The court in North Carolina Milk Commission v. 
National Food Stores, Inc., 154 S.E.2d 548 (N.C. 1967,1 
commenting on this point stated: 
The very purpose and nature of competition in-
volves the intent to attract to one's self customers 
who might otherwise trade with a rival producer or 
seller. 
In some cases the stores may have other reasons 
dlong with the reason to induce the purchase of 
other merchandise such as a desire to reduce in-
ventory in items like Lee's Men's Pants or when 
they fail to purchase sufficient items, such as : 
turkeys, at one price and must repurchase at a high 
er price for the same advertised sale. Although al 
times it may be difficult to determine the prevali-
ing intent, the intent to induce the purchase of othe: 
merchandise is always there and when this is done 
with below cost selling the evil the legislature 
wished to prevent is present. 
Even though it may be difficult to determine 
the prevailing intent, it is submitted that whenever 
a store induces a customer to purchase an item sel:. 
ing below cost it has taken that particular sale awa· 
from another store ,=md has 11nfairly diverted trade 
,rom a compemor by selling De1ow cost. (T. 45, 46J 
The competitor has also been injured in that he did 
not qet that particular sale or at least he did not have 
·• J iir n0p=.!rt1 mity to compete for it. 
The court in Laundry Operating Co. v. Spauld-
:ng L::~undry and Dry Cleaning Co., supra, stated: 
... opinion is that to the extent a competitor is 
caused to lose business, competition is destroyed. 
It would hardly be in keeping with common sense to 
hold that activities otherwise falling within the in-
terdict of the statute would be proper so long as 
the intent of the guilty party is something short of 
a design to effect the complete destruction of com-
petition .... 
CONCLUSION 
TlY' Leg1sla.ture, with the proper authority, has 
ijeter rnined that the selling of merchandise below 
cost is dangerous to the public welfare and has 
passed a law to prevent it, with a few exceptions. 
The courts of other jurisdictions have held statutes 
s1mila.r to the statute here in question to be consti--
lutionally valid as an attempt to prevent the evils 0£ 
'~elling merchandise below cost and eventually de-
~ttny1ng competition. 
Also, lhe evidence was such that the lower 
'.c11rt should have held the intent in making a sale 
cnst w:Js to induce the purchase of other mer-
1,_L~) Ci of unfairly diverting trade from a com-
.. : i '·'r u otherwise injuring a competitor. 
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It is respectfully submitted that the fmdmgs and 
judgment of the lower court be reversed in its en-
tirety. 
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